Flipkart's revenue crosses ₹1.45 lakh crore, losses shrink

Did Flipkart actually file for an IPO?

No. Flipkart has not filed a draft offer document, not even confidentially, as of the latest reporting. It completed the structural precondition, moving its domicile from Singapore to India in March 2026, but no paperwork exists with SEBI, India's securities market regulator. Walmart, which owns about 85%, has directed Flipkart to defer the IPO until it breaks even by end of FY27.

Why would Walmart want Flipkart profitable before letting it list?

Walmart owns roughly 85% of Flipkart and sees a public listing as the moment its stake gets valued by the market. A money-losing IPO would force it to sell shares at a discount or carry a depressed valuation. By demanding EBITDA breakeven by end of FY27, Walmart links its exit premium to Flipkart's margin discipline, not market timing.

Why does the group's loss barely fall when its stores do better?

The gap comes from what sits outside the operating business. Adjusted operating losses narrowed 17%, or around ₹1,600 crore, and operating margin improved from -7.7% to -5.4%, yet net loss fell only 2.1%. Flipkart itself points to higher finance costs, derecognition of deferred tax assets and exceptional items. The B2C arm's net loss also widened to ₹5,498 crore from ₹1,694 crore, despite lower expenses. Our read: accounting and financing charges, not store operations, are now the main drag on the headline number.[e5]

Why does the group's net loss barely shrink when its operating losses improved so much?

The gap lies in items outside operations. Operating losses narrowed ₹1,600 crore, yet net loss fell only ₹200 crore. Flipkart cites higher finance costs, derecognition of deferred tax assets, and exceptional items. Finance costs nearly doubled to ₹1,209 crore. The B2C arm's net loss ballooned from ₹1,694 crore to ₹5,498 crore despite lower expenses. Our read: accounting treatments of past tax benefits and one-off charges are masking the operational improvement for now.[e5]

What is the real bottleneck to Flipkart's profitability?

Logistics and storage costs jumped 28.9% to ₹15,154 crore, now 54% of other expenses, building delivery networks is capital-hungry. Finance costs nearly doubled to ₹1,209 crore. Even as gross margins rose 23%, these fixed costs eat the gains. Our read: the bottleneck is scale economics, not sales growth.

Why did people expect a Flipkart IPO in 2026?

People expected a Flipkart IPO because the company completed its move from Singapore to India in March 2026, a step required to list on Indian exchanges. Reports pointed to a late-2026 or early-2027 listing. But Walmart, its majority owner, later directed Flipkart to delay the IPO until it breaks even by the end of FY27.

Why did the operating loss improve but the net loss barely move?

Flipkart's adjusted operating loss narrowed by about ₹1,600 crore in FY26, yet the net loss fell by only ₹178 crore. The company attributes the gap to three items: finance costs nearly doubling to ₹1,209 crore, the derecognition of deferred tax assets previously booked, and certain exceptional items. These one-time and financing charges absorbed most of the operational gains before they reached the bottom line. Our read: the tax asset reversal is an accounting consequence of the redomiciliation, not a sign of worsening business health.

Why does the group's own marketplace look like it is shrinking?

The consolidated group revenue rose 18% to ₹1.45 lakh crore, but the B2C arm, Flipkart Internet, saw its revenue from operations fall 19.3% to ₹16,295 crore in FY26, and its net loss widened from ₹1,694 crore to ₹5,498 crore. The group growth is coming from other businesses like Myntra, Cleartrip, logistics and platform services, which now sit under the same entity. Our read: the core marketplace is the weak spot Walmart is trying to fix before any listing.

Why would shutting the funding tap help Flipkart fix its marketplace?

Walmart's directive pauses all external fundraising, private or public, until Flipkart hits EBITDA breakeven by end of FY27. With no fresh capital coming in, Flipkart must fund its own losses from operations. The core marketplace, Flipkart Internet, is the weak spot: its revenue fell 19.3% while losses widened to ₹5,498 crore. Our read: Walmart is using the funding freeze as leverage to force a fix of that business, since the group's growth is already coming from other arms like Myntra and Cleartrip.

Why would Walmart risk a lower valuation by forcing this delay?

Walmart owns roughly 85% of Flipkart and wants the listing to reflect margin discipline, not market timing. A money-losing IPO would force it to sell at a discount or carry a depressed valuation, as seen in the gap between the last hard transaction at roughly $36 billion and speculative reports of $70 billion. Our read: Walmart is betting that fixing the core marketplace now, even at the cost of delay, will command a higher premium later than any quick listing would.

How does the B2C arm earn money if its revenue keeps falling?

The B2C arm, Flipkart Internet, still earns through commissions on seller transactions, advertising, logistics services like Ekart, and subscriptions such as Flipkart Plus. Its revenue fell 19.3% to ₹16,295 crore in FY26, yet total expenses only dropped 3.6%, which is why its net loss widened to ₹5,498 crore. The business is not shrinking in activity but is earning less per rupee of cost, a sign the marketplace is being squeezed before any IPO.

Can Walmart simply wait out a longer delay before Flipkart lists?

Walmart can wait, but the delay widens the gap between the $36 billion last hard valuation and the $70 billion speculative figure, and no DRHP has been filed yet, so there is no confirmation of any price. A longer wait also pushes Flipkart closer to PhonePe's independent IPO window, and reports say Flipkart wants to avoid competing with its sibling for institutional demand. Our read: the freeze is a bet, not a timetable, and Walmart will hold the line only if the marketplace's losses stop widening.

What happens to Flipkart's valuation if it hits the profit target late?

Valuation estimates already swing widely, from about $36 billion in the last hard transaction to $70 billion in speculative reports. If Flipkart misses Walmart's FY27 EBITDA breakeven deadline, the listing window shifts again, extending the gap between those figures. Investors would have to price the company without fresh financials, and the delay would push Flipkart closer to competing with PhonePe for institutional demand, which some reports say Flipkart wants to avoid.

Why did Flipkart's net loss stay flat at ₹8,468 crore?

Flipkart’s operating losses did narrow by 17%, or about ₹1,600 crore, in fiscal 2026, with its adjusted operating margin improving from -7.7% to -5.4%. But finance costs nearly doubled, from ₹649 crore to ₹1,209 crore, and the company also wrote off deferred tax assets and booked exceptional items. Together, these offset the operational gains, leaving the net loss barely changed.

How does the consolidated profit hide the health of Flipkart's core store?

The consolidated results cover the whole group: Myntra, Cleartrip, logistics, and other businesses, not just the main marketplace. The B2C arm Flipkart Internet alone saw revenue fall 19.3% to ₹16,295 crore and its net loss widen more than threefold to ₹5,498 crore in FY26. Group revenue still rose 18.2% because other businesses grew. Our read: the flagship store is the weak spot, and the group's top line masks that decline. ([e5])

Why is the core store's revenue falling while the group grows?

The consolidated group results include Myntra, Cleartrip, logistics, and other businesses, not just the main marketplace. Flipkart Internet, the B2C arm, saw revenue fall 19.3% in FY26 while group revenue rose 18.2%. The group masks this decline because other units grew faster. Our read: shoppers are spending more on fashion and travel, while the core marketplace's growth has stalled, making it the weak point Walmart is forcing the company to fix. (cites: e5)

Why is the flagship store's revenue shrinking while the group grows?

The consolidated group results include Myntra, Cleartrip, logistics, and other businesses, not just the main marketplace. Flipkart Internet, the B2C arm, saw revenue fall 19.3% in FY26 while group revenue rose 18.2%. The group masks this decline because other units grew faster. Our read: shoppers are spending more on fashion and travel, while the core marketplace's growth has stalled, making it the weak point Walmart is forcing the company to fix.

Would listing the logistics arm help Flipkart raise money without the IPO?

Yes, a partial listing is on the table even while the parent is barred from raising funds. Flipkart-backed logistics firm Shadowfax, in which it holds a stake, has already filed a confidential DRHP for a roughly ₹2,500 crore IPO at an estimated ₹8,500 crore valuation. That listing is entirely separate from Flipkart's own IPO and signals that investors will pay for the ecosystem even while the core marketplace stays loss-making. Our read: expect Walmart to spin off more businesses like Shadowfax to unlock value and test market appetite before risking the flagship listing. ([e4])

What is really dragging the core store down?

The B2C arm's expenses fell only 3.6% even as revenue dropped 19.3%, so fixed costs like logistics and storage, which jumped 28.9% group-wide, now sit on a much smaller revenue base. That is why its net loss more than tripled to ₹5,498 crore. The group's other businesses are subsidising a store that cannot cut costs fast enough to match its shrinking sales. Our read: the marketplace is losing the scale battle while Walmart waits for breakeven that this trajectory will not deliver by FY27.

Could Flipkart split off more units like it did with PhonePe?

It already has a template. PhonePe was demerged from the Flipkart Group in 2023 and is several stages ahead in its own IPO process, and logistics firm Shadowfax, in which Flipkart holds a stake, has filed a confidential DRHP for its own listing. With the parent barred from raising funds until EBITDA breakeven, spinning off units is the only way to unlock value from the ecosystem. Our read: expect more Shadowfax-style listings before any flagship IPO, since they let Walmart test investor appetite without risking the core store. ([e3], [e4])

Why does Walmart need the core store profitable before any fundraising?

Walmart told Flipkart to defer its IPO and any pre-IPO fundraising until the company hits EBITDA breakeven by end of FY27. Since the B2C arm is where the losses are concentrated, breakeven depends on fixing that business first. The group's improving operating margin of -5.4% mostly reflects other units. Our read: Walmart is forcing Flipkart to prove the core store can make money before it risks a public valuation. ([e2], [e5])

What would listing the core business at a $36 billion valuation actually imply?

The last hard transaction valued Flipkart at roughly $36 billion, while speculative reports suggest up to $70 billion. That gap shows the market is pricing in either a successful turnaround or a stalled one. If Flipkart lists without hitting Walmart's FY27 EBITDA breakeven target, it would likely have to accept the lower end of that range, forcing Walmart to sell its roughly 85% stake at a discount. Our read: the core store falling short is the difference between a $36 billion and a $70 billion listing, which is why Walmart is holding the line on profitability. ([e3])